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Abstract
Despite the popularity of blockchain technology in
the supply chain domain, cases with adoption beyond
the pilot phase are limited. Even though technology fit
is essential for blockchain adoption, we find network
fit to be equally important for participating companies
in a network. This research explores how the network
affects value creation beyond a technology fit. Studying
two cases, one from the gemstone industry and another
from the shipping industry, we use the task technology
fit model, network effects, and structural embeddedness
as theoretical lenses to explore the fit that leads to
the success of blockchain adoption. Our investigation
reveals the task technology fit as a prerequisite and
shows central organizations acting as initiators in the
early phase, trying to extend the network in subsequent
phases. Our investigation indicates that the network
fit, autonomy, and equivalence of the organizations
contributed to the successful adoption of blockchains.
1. Introduction
The disruptive nature of Blockchain technology
came into the limelight when cryptocurrencies (such as
Bitcoin) were introduced as decentralized peer-to-peer
digital cash systems which can run without the
intervention of any central actors like banks and other
financial institutions. After the cryptocurrencies, the
supply chain domain is one of the early adopters of
the blockchain due to the premise that blockchain
characteristics such as immutability, transparency, and
trust can help to solve some of the challenges faced
by the supply chain domain. Blockchain has the
potential to change how stakeholders share supply
chain information via a more trusted, secured, and
accessible over a distributed ledger [12]. Some of
the supply chain processes where the transparency and
traceability provided by the blockchain technology can
bring transformation are: improving product safety and
security, fight against counterfeit products, enhancing
inventory management and replenishment, decreasing
transaction costs, reducing the role of intermediaries,
and many others [3].
Even though the technological features of
blockchain technology are suitably fitted for harnessing
the benefits in the supply chain domain, the number
of successful supply chain projects that adopted
blockchain and went beyond the pilot study are quite
limited [19]. Sternberg et al. [19] argued that the
success of blockchain-based applications in the supply
chain dependent on the number of actors or the critical
mass of the companies that are collaborating in the
network. Furthermore, the authors have also identified
that in the case of an inter-organizational setting, there
exist several tensions between the positive and negative
driving factors for blockchain adoption, which need
to be resolved for successful adoption. However, it
is interesting to explore where does the actual value
creation comes from in the case of blockchain adoption
in an inter-organizational setting. Does it come from the
technology fit, i.e., matching the system’s requirements
with the technological features? Or else does it
come from network participants, i.e., how well the
participating actors collaborate to co-create the value?
In this research, we explore these aspects with the
help of two successful case studies from the supply
chain domain, where the blockchain solutions have
been gone beyond the pilot studies and adopted in
the production setting. The first case study is in the
gemstone industry, and the solution is built on the
Provenance Proof Blockchain that leverages blockchain
technology to provide transparency, authenticity, and
integrity along the supply chain from the remote mines
to the consumer. The second case study is in the
shipping industry, where the TradeLens platform is
built on Hyperledger Fabric blockchain technology. It
provides transparency by sharing real-time shipping
information for the containers’ journey across multiple
organizations in the supply chain, e.g., from an origin
in China to a destination in Europe. We propose the
following research question to understand the interplay





between the technology fit and network effects among
these case studies.
In the case of blockchain technology
adoption, what does the fit mean when we
investigate from the network point of view?
To address the research question, we apply Task
Technology Fit, Network Effects, and Structural
Embeddedness as theoretical lens to investigate to what
extent the adoption of blockchain technology created
value to respective stakeholders. Investigating two
blockchain case studies, one from the gemstone industry
and another from the shipping industry, we explore how
the technology fit and network effects contributed to
the value appropriation. In the next section, we will
present theoretical background along with a brief review
of related literature, and then we present the two case
studies in section 3. In section 4 we will present our
analysis and discussion, followed by a conclusion in the
end.
2. Theoretical Background
This section presents related literature, followed by
an elaboration on our theoretical lens for this paper,
containing three theoretical frames: Task Technology
Fit, Network Effects, and Structural Embeddedness.
2.1. Related Literature
Several publications [14, 3] explore the use of
blockchain technology in the logistics and supply
chains domain. The research work of Herm and
Janiesch [10] reveals and prioritizes requirements for a
blockchain-based collaboration platform in supply chain
networks (SCN). Saberi et al. [16] identify four adoption
barriers: inter-organizational, intra-organizational,
technical, and external barriers, which can reduce
the advantages of using blockchain in supply chains.
Straubert et al. [20] took an interesting view that
tracking and tracing in supply chain management using
private permissioned blockchain does not offer any
extra advantage compared to the existing technologies.
They also claim that public permissionless blockchains
can provide new functionalities, but all participants
must be pseudonymous and must have read/write/verify
permissions. Another research work by Blossey et
al. [1] identifies three primary technical benefits:
transparency, automation, and validation in using
blockchain to integrate the supply chains. Seebacher
and Maleshkova [17] proposed a layer-based model
for capturing the blockchain-supported supply chain
network for modeling the use cases of traceability
and anti-counterfeiting of products, based on a
business model, network composition, and technical
implementation. Similarly, another research work
by Mazumdar et al. [13] explores the usage of a
blockchain-IoT-based framework for documenting
the product life cycle with IoT devices attached to
physical devices. Finally, Farshidi et al. [7] developed a
multicriteria decision-making problem and introduced
a decision model for the blockchain platform selection
problem based on the technology selection framework.
Such existing research focuses on technical
properties and resulting capabilities of blockchain
technology. Our paper explores blockchain adoption
from an entirely different perspective. In our research
work, we take a network perspective view and
investigate to what extent the adoption of blockchain
technology created value to various stakeholders in the
network. Beyond Task Technology Fit, we apply the
lenses of Network effects and Structural Embeddedness
that have been used in different context to research
actors positions and resulting value creation.
2.2. Task Technology Fit
We intend to investigate the performance of
technology, here in particular blockchain technology,
expressed as adoption by potential users for a specific
purpose. To explain and thus predict such adoption
of technology, the framework of task-technology fit
(TTF) [9] is well-established and frequently used,
among similar models such as Technology Acceptance
Models [4], and the Unified Theory of Acceptance and
Use of Technology (UTAUT) models [22]. TTF helps
to predict the adoption and application of a specific
technology for a specific task based on a concept of fit.
With this line of reasoning, TTF shows characteristics of
a variance theory [21]. It assumes a causal link between
the construct fit and the appropriation and, consequently,
the application of the technology. Fit as such
describes either consistency in terms of covariation, or
it may be framed as multidimensional gestalt expressing
congruence or adherence vs. deviation to a proposed
profile [23]. In its original setup, TTF is single
actor-oriented and is assessing technology fit from the
viewpoint of an individual user. Though this implies
certain limitations, TTF has been augmented towards
the assessment of technologies for groups [23], and
it is increasingly discussed in the context of network
technologies such as inter-organizational systems [16].
We understand the existence of such a kind of
task-technology-fit as a necessary condition prior to any
organization’s users’ adoption of blockchain technology.
However, about blockchains’ character of being a
network technology, we do not see this necessarily as a
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sufficient condition. Different from an application for an
individual user, in a network of different involved actors,
there is no clear causality between fit and appropriation.
Perceived fit and appropriation result from a dynamic
process and mechanisms influenced by the scope and
diversity of involved actors and their interpretation in
their context. In a network view, fit thus requires
elements of a process theory [21] which is as such,
however, not included in the TTF concept.
2.3. Network Effects and Structural
Embeddedness
Consequently, there is a need to reflect on
influencing factors towards this process of evaluating
benefits and sacrifices [15], which are perceived and
influenced differently by the role and number of
involved actors and their diverse assessment of resulting
value. Such value is not static but an episodic
outcome in an ongoing process, increased by network
benefits and reduced by network sacrifices, i.e., by the
dynamics and effects resulting from being a part of
the network. Already Katz and Shapiro [11] refer to
network externalities to investigate the likelihood of
rivaling technologies adoption. Accordingly, in the
absence of a sponsor, a superior technology of today
is likely to sustain dominating. However, when there
is a sponsor involved, also the inferior one of two rival
technologies may gradually dominate. The more diverse
the actors in the ecosystem are, the more likely is it
that fit is perceived differently by them. The more
central an actor is within the network, the higher is
the potential influence on the outcome. Next to the
diversity of actors, this emphasizes actors’ centrality and
governance legitimization within an institutional setup.
Dong et al. [6] introduced, for instance, a concept named
institutional distance as a summation of normative,
cognitive, and regulative distances to investigate the
joint performance of collaborative firms.
In our approach, we refer to the concept of
structural embeddedness as presented by Gnyawali and
Madhavan [8], describing the position of actors in
regards to access to assets, information, and status of the
actor. Embeddedness is deducted from the actors’ role in
the context of the specific industry network description
and the network, i.e., here, the blockchain, under
consideration. Embeddedness appears in particular
interesting for our purpose as it specifies how the
structural properties of cooperative networks influence
the competitive dynamics in the network. This relates
on a firm level to a description of behavior as a
consequence of centrality and autonomy of the actors
and, in particular, differences among them.
Pairwise comparison implies a view on the
equivalence of roles and positions, and on a network
level, embeddedness refers to a description of network
density, i.e., the interconnection among the actors in
the network [8]. Our assumption is that the greater
the inter-connectedness, the greater the density, and
the faster the flow of information and resources in the
network, the more business value can be generated.
Further, the more actors and organizations connected
creates the network effect, which produces exponential
growth of both the network and as well in the generation
of business values. With higher density, behavioral
patterns should develop more easily but as well the
facilitation of sanctions and counteraction to egoisms.
The denser it is, the more it is expected that the
network functions as a closed network and is showing
a less competitive environment. Increasing density thus
potentially mitigates effects of centrality and autonomy
and thus resembles the dynamic effects of network
externalities towards self-enforcing mechanisms of
network patterns of behavior. While seeing density in
principle with a positive effect on value, it may be also
questioned whether there is not some level of saturation
or even counter effect when density and size of the
network become gradually too large.
As illustrated in Figure 1, we altogether frame
appropriation as a result of an evaluation process
that combines three different sources of value created
by a specific technology. Task value stems from
task-technology-fit in its classic understanding.
Relationship value refers to the cooperative and
competitive positions of specific actors within the
relevant network. Network value finally is different
from relationship value as it is not a consequence of
the position in the network but a result of being in
the network and benefiting or suffering from network
dynamics as expresses in network effects as a whole.
3. Case Studies
This section will first present the blockchain
adoption case study from the colored gemstone industry,
and then we will switch to the TradeLens case study
from the shipping industry.
3.1. Case Study: Colored Gemstone Industry
Industry: The colored gemstone industry reveals
three peculiarities. First, the stones vary largely in their
value per carat, depending on the characteristics of the
stone, such as scarcity, quality, origin, and customer
attractiveness. Hence, assessing the characteristics
of a stone is key for evaluating the value of a



























Figure 1. Conceptual framework on drivers of value and appropriation in blockchain networks
colored gemstone industry is highly complex and
heterogeneous. There are many artisanal mines and
only a few large-scale mines with heavy machinery
on the mining stage. These are followed by traders
that have either a regional, national, or international
customer networks, refiners with diverse specializations
in terms of cut and treatment, exporters, regional,
national, and international wholesalers, jewelers, and
retail brands [18]. Third, the transactions within
the industry are based on mutual trust and reputation
between transaction partners (e.g., miners and regional
traders). A large volume of the trade is informal
with limited transparency for external parties, causing
substantial challenges for financing, insurance, and
ethical standards. The previously described three
peculiarities turned into a burden given the lack of
transparency in the industry. First, for end-customers
or upstream actors (e.g., retail brands), the actions of
previous stages in the value chain are not transparent
given the complexity and heterogeneity of the value
chain as well as the informal transactions. Hence, buyers
fear to finance unethical or ecological harmful actions
in the downstream value chain. Second, end-customer
as layperson having a hard time assessing the
characteristics of a stone and its value. Consequently,
end-customers are expecting more transparency on
aspects such as origin, authenticity, and physical
qualities.
Blockchain application: Against this backdrop,
Gübelin Gem Lab 1 and Everledger 2 introduced
1https://www.gubelingemlab.com/en/
2https://www.everledger.io/
the Provenance Proof Blockchain 3 for the colored
gemstone industry. The blockchain solutions allow
creating a digital twin for each colored gemstone
and storing all relevant information (e.g., physical
dimensions, color, cut) along the value chain. Each
stage in the value chain has its own role and enables
to upload of role-specific information. The gemstone
owner can access this information and thereby trace
back the stone to its origin, gain an overview of all steps
within the value chain, and verify the authenticity of the
gemstone. Over 500 gemstone actors from mine join the
blockchain initiative to ring, accounting for a 500,000
colored gemstones that are recorded in the blockchain
by July 2021.
Technology fit: The Provenance Proof blockchain
addresses the task of providing more transparency for
the colored gemstone industry. First, the blockchain
records and reveals all historical transactions with
details to the owner, thereby enhancing the gemstone’s
traceability and visibility of all value creation steps.
Moreover, the blockchain enables to store this
information immutably and securely, providing a single
source of truth. In addition, Gübelin Gem Lab offers to
tag, i.e., emeralds with nanoparticles to create a unique
identifier for each mine. By storing this identifier in
the blockchain, each digital record can be verified by
matching the record with the physical stone. Second,
the blockchain application is designed to account for
the heterogeneity of all actors in the gemstone industry
and their context. For instance, rural mines might
have limited access to wifi or phones with less image
3https://www.provenanceproof.com/
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resolution. Hence, the data can be uploaded at a later
stage (e.g., by the trader). Thereby, the task to allow
enhanced transparency within this context is supported
by the technology. By design, blockchain allows the
addition of new transaction data, e.g., the photography
of a stone, and to trace back each entry. Therefore,
manipulated information can always be traced back to its
originator and thus penalizing its actions. Consequently,
the technology is designed to increase the integrity
of the data. For all owners of the stone, including
temporary owners such as traders, the Provenance
Proof Blockchain creates transparency, authenticity, and
integrity as a value in an industry that has suffered from
these regards. Both seller and buyer of a gemstone at
each stage are now able to disclose relevant information
on the origin and journey of the stone, leading to more
trust on both transaction sides as a key value.
Network: Provenance Proof is a permissioned
blockchain. Each actor in the colored gemstone
industry that aims to read/write/verify has to undergo
a know your customer (KYC) process before joining
the initiative. After joining, each actor can choose
to contribute to the consensus mechanism, enabling
also smaller organizations to join without having to
invest in additional resources. Actors that aim only at
reading the information on a particular stone are able
to do so without having to pass a KYC process. As a
consequence, a network is established across the entire
value chain from mine to end-customer. Especially
downstream actors such as end-customers, retail brands,
jeweler manufacturers gain a far better overview of the
entire value chain up to their stage. Previously, the
industry’s information flow was limited to subsequent
stages. The network of Provenance Proof allows
information to flow across multiple stages, offering the
opportunity to build new relationships with previous
stages in the supply chain. The higher the number of
actors in the industry, the more relations will be formed,
increasing the value and opportunity for all entities.
3.2. Case Study: TradeLens in shipping
industry
Industry: World trade is fueled by container ships
that transports a large portion of world trade from the
origin, e.g., in China, to destinations of consumers, e.g.,
in Europe. Goods stored in standard containers shipped
internationally via the sea accounts for 80 of world
trade. The transport via sea cost less than via air and
land; however, the industry is challenged with more than
20% administrative cost and relatively poor performance
even there is high competition among service providers.
Blockchain application: TradeLens is a blockchain
technology-based platform for sharing shipping
information targeted international shipping in
containers. The majority of shipping lines within
containerized shipping whom in total ships 66% of
world traded transported in containers are committed
to TradeLens. TradeLens was initiated by the
market-leading shipping line Maersk (based on industry
research) and piloted with IBM as the technology
provider of the open-source Hyperledger Fabric
(there are more than twenty competing technologies
prototyped within the shipping industry). Later
expanded to a consortium including three of its main
competitors in the industry.
Technology fit: The fit between the task and the
technology for the individual user is similar since the
user use the same user interaction of their organizations
legacy system but the value for both the user and
the organization is increased by the interfaces to the
blockchain, since that through API’s provide real-time
information directly from the source being other
organisations in the supply chain, accordingly, e.g. the
actual location and document approval status whereby
logistic coordination can be improved accordingly the
value provided when utilizing blockchain is significantly
enhanced.
At the network level, the shipping involves
more than 30 organizations that have digitized their
information within their legacy systems. The result
is several distributed information islands which are
not interlinked. Blockchain technology is by design
distributed where each node holds information about the
events published by others. Therefore at the network
level, the fit between the task and the technology
can be characterized as mirroring the information
islands spread globally across the organizations involved
in international shipping and the distributed design
globally on the internet across the nodes of blockchain
technology. The blockchain technology builds on a
distributed ledger for key events, e.g., export certificate
document approved and container loaded on a specific
container vessel, including more than 200 standardized
events per container journey. Those events are published
by more than 40 different organizations involved in
the journey, from shippers ordering the transport,
service providers loading the container, transporting,
etc. and authorities approving (or rejecting) the
movements. Having all those organizations publishing
events for the whole journey from origin to destination
creates a network effect resulting in a transparent
supply chain where proactive actions can be taken
to improve performance. The primary purpose and
value that blockchain potentially brings are not so
much tracking the supply chain of containerized
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shipping since that’s already possible (through event
information provided by shipping lines and forwarders
for selected key events) to a large extend but rather
the transparency opening insight into the administration
of the containers (which prevents it from being moved
on); secondly, the possibilities of automation of manual
administrative tasks with the smart contract features of
blockchain technology was the convincing argument for
the investment of the CFO at Maersk, which would
strategically impact the shipping line’s competitive
position and the industry performance as such.
Network: The ecosystem of maritime shipping
can be described as supply chains for the physical
transport and as networks particularly when including
the administration. Within each specific of the
supply chains, each organization is autonomous with a
well-defined role, e.g., the shipping company transports
the containers at sea, the terminal operator lifts the
containers on and off vessels and trucks, and trucking
companies transport the containers at land. Authorities
govern, e.g., the containers when at ports. The
flow, including information between the actors in the
supply chain, is characterized as pier to pier, and each
organization is reluctant to share information for various
reasons. Accordingly, embeddedness as network
density and the interconnection among the actors in
the network is very fragmented and with separated
organizations and no central actor. The blockchain is
permissioned, wherefore every event is published by a
trusted organization; accordingly, the proof of work is
limited to the cryptographic part, which requires little
energy compared to permissionless blockchains (used
by, e.g., crypto-currencies). Further, the design of equal
powered nodes in the blockchain respects and supports
the autonomy of organizations involved in international
shipping, ranging from shippers to competing service
companies and to powerful authorities.
Initially, Maersk took the lead and, in a joint venture
with the technology provider, offered the TradeLens
solution to other organizations commercially. Maersk
already had close collaboration and alliances with
service providers (owner of some) and competing
shipping lines and authorities. We conclude the
structural embeddedness is high within the maritime
shipping; however, the network effects creating
business value did not appear since only a limited
number of organizations joined TradeLens. After two
years without additional major organizations joined
TradeLens and their competitors initiating alternative
blockchain solutions, Maersk gave up and invited
their competitors on board, offering them both control
and share in future business value, which resulted in
the majority of leading shipping lines committing to
TradeLens. Accordingly, TradeLens has a commitment
from container shipping lines transporting 2/3 of world
trade, which can generate significant both network
effect and business value when digital interfaces are
implemented. Remark that the interfaces between the
individual organizations’ legacy systems and TradeLens
take time (years) to develop, wherefore the business
value is yet to be proven.
Initially, the blockchain nodes are allocated to
channels where each shipping line is the primary
responsible. Accordingly, the consensus is handled
firstly by the node owner but can be questioned and
challenged by others. The consortium will when the
blockchain solution is adapted (the primary task is
implementing the API integration to legacy systems)
control a significant share of world trade to the
extent that it could become a de facto standard,
causing a positive network effect with large coverage.
Such a standard can improve the performance of the
international containerized shipping via sea to the
benefits of both shippers and the industry as such;
additionally, the authorities can benefit significantly
from the transparency into shipping information.
4. Analysis and Discussion
We divided the analysis and discussion into the three
drivers task value, network value, and relationship value
that were elaborated in the theoretical background.
4.1. Task Value
In both cases, blockchain technology is well
suited to meet the requested task. In the Gemstone
case, blockchain enables transparency, authenticity,
and integrity in the industry that suffered from these
regards. This creates particular value for sellers
and buyers of a gemstone at each stage, especially
for downstream parties close to ending customers.
In the TradeLens case, blockchain enables sharing
shipping information in real-time across the supply
chain and promises transparency, allowing for better
coordination and reduced cost. In its later phase, it is
augmented towards smart contracts for automation of
administration. Transparency provides direct value for
shippers that may be indirectly absorbed by shipping
lines and service providers. In the later phase, are also
authorities included. The whole industry is supposed to
benefit from resulting efficiency gains.
4.2. Network value
Both cases reveal network externalities that drive
the dynamic development of the networks. Negative
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externalities refer to potential dependencies that appear
in both cases, primarily in the early phase of the projects.
In the TradeLens case, this is, e.g., dependent on IBM
and Maersk in terms of the blockchain application. In
the Gemstone case, the technological dependency on
Everledger as a technology provider and the provider of
nanoparticles (product tags) implies a lock-in in terms
of technology and network dependency. Furthermore, a
growing network with a larger number of actors limits
the pace of refining the application, which is currently
addressed in the Gemstone case by defining a board
of governance. However, as the value of transparency
depends on the scope and size of the network as
well as the number of involved actors, there are
apparent positive externalities. The gapless traceability
of gemstones increases with the number of involved
parties. Moreover, sourcing opportunities increased for
downstream actors (e.g., jewelry manufacturers) due to
additional relationships across multiple value stages.
Hence, there is additional value stemming from the
network and the network effect itself that increases the
value of the applications and thus creating dynamics
for upscaling of the blockchain applications. In the
TradeLens case that reached up to two-thirds of the
relevant market share at the time of this writing and
almost becomes a defacto standard, this appears even
more significant than for the Gemstone case in an
industry, which is more heterogeneous and permeable in
its setup. But also, in the Gemstone case, the adoption
increased from originally a Kernel with few bigger
miners to now 320 actors adopted solution, spanning
across all stages and different company sizes in the
industry. However, both cases reveal restrictions that
have been hindering the exploitation of the technology
value. Both cases exhibit similar patterns of behavior for
different groups of actors. In line with propositions of
Gnyawali and Madhavan [8], we observe a central actor
as initiators of the blockchain (Maersk and Gübelin Gem
Lab). Though the technology value is apparent and
network value is assumed, this action is responded by
the other actors with hesitation towards collaboration
up to even joining or creating competing blockchains.
Structural embeddedness provides a relevant lens for
explaining these restrictions, the resulting predictions of
actor behavior and relationship value.
4.3. Relationship value
On a firm level, embeddedness is operationalized
based on the centrality, and autonomy of the actors,
and on network level based on equivalence and density.
We use a relative scale of High, Medium and Low to
compare the early and current stages for the cases and
their industries. Table 1 summarizes the insights on the
relationship value.
Centrality: refers to actors’ different positions
based on their roles in the network. In both cases,
we see a confirmative pattern to the proposition of
Gnyawali and Madhavan [8] that it is most likely a
central actor that initiates action and that lower centrality
of other actors restricts their ability to respond equally.
TradeLens had in its first setup a central actor with the
periphery of other actors. Proposing TradeLens as a
service platform was putting the carrier Maersk as a
central actor into a stronger competitive position than
other actors in the same network echelon of the industry.
The other carriers did not collaborate but tried with
limited success to maintain their own central position
with their own creation of alternative blockchains. In the
new form, the blockchain becomes more of a polycentral
construct. The initiator is less central and acting
like the other carriers as polycentric multiplicators that
bring their network to authorities and customers. This
required a different organization of roles into a form of
allied governance, including the sharing of the business
value, i.e., profits from TradeLens. The Provenance
Proof blockchain was also initiated by a central actor
Gübelin Gem Labs. For the adopters, the participation
in the network is increasing centrality for other actors
compared to those that are not part of the blockchain
and in comparison to their previous position.
The impact of actors’ specific positions, expressed
via centrality, is closely related to the structural
autonomy of the actor. Structural autonomy refers
to Burts [2] concept of structural holes. Structurally
autonomous actors have structural holes between the
actors they are connected to but are free of structural
holes at their own end. Especially networks rich in
structural holes opens opportunities for shifting control
toward a focal actor that is more autonomous than the
others [8]. We do not see this as a matter of the absolute
degree of autonomy but more on autonomy gradients
among actors - particularly those of similar types such
as the carriers in the TradeLens Case or more prominent
retail brands in the gemstone industry. In a focal
actor-oriented approach, such as, for example, a control
tower but also the original setup of TradeLens, designed
as a commercial service, might increase structural
autonomy for one actor but reduce it for collaborators
and thus create or increase an autonomy gradient.
In the TradeLens case, carriers are connected to
authorities and shippers but not connected to other
carriers as these are competitors. Although lately
several alliances were founded, the connection of these
alliances is rare. Instead, an alliance is competing
with an alliance. Overall, there remain structural
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holes horizontally between carriers, or at least between
carriers of different alliances, and there is more freedom
of structural holes in the more vertical view of the
network. This means there is high autonomy among
the carriers in the industry. Other levels, such as the
forwarders, show a similar structure. This autonomy
structure was not well represented by the first setup of
TradeLens with Maersk as a central service provider but
simultaneously also service user that is in competition
to the other carriers.
Autonomy: Collaborating would imply for the other
carriers the risk of sacrificing their structural autonomy.
According to embeddedness theory, this asymmetry in
autonomy weakening less autonomous actors in their
ability to respond. They only can avoid this for the
blockchain by not joining and competing with their
own blockchains. By changing to a more polycentral
structure, the structural holes between actors on the
same level or between alliances remain similar for
all of the actors, as before. Carriers continue to act
autonomously but now act as multipliers to authorities
and shippers instead of ”sacrificing” links to those and
thus their autonomy to one focal node.
In the same way, the gemstone industry exhibits
structural holes between horizontal actors such as
miners, cutters, or retail brands. However, in contrast to
TradeLens, the initiator, Gübelin Gem Lab, had a high
degree of autonomy from the start, having tiny structural
holes in all directions of the value chain. While none
of the competing gem labs joined the solution, actors
on all other value stages joined the network, increasing
their autonomy by gaining additional. The structural
autonomy was key for the initiator, helping to increase
the number of adopters by drawing on the direct ties to
other actors on all value stages. For the joining actors,
connecting via the blockchain also indirectly bridged
structural holes due to a lack of business relationships.
Equivalence refers now to pairwise comparisons
of actors and the similarity of their network patterns.
Structural equivalent firms are viewed as having similar
assets, information, and status flows. And as a
result, behave similarly. To some extent, this links
to mimicking mechanisms as known from institutional
theory [5]. The Gemstone case is characterized by
heterogeneous actors such as miners, retailers, etc. In
this diverse ecosystem, we observe a pattern of behavior
related to actor size, as in the beginning large miners
almost exclusively use the blockchain. On the one hand,
this would imply a rather equivalent network inside the
blockchain and patterns of behavior. Large miners join,
and the small firms stay outside. On the other hand,
this indicates in regards to the whole industry a rather
high lack of equivalence that restricts upscaling and
adoption. We thus see in the beginning a low level of
equivalence that divides large, international actors in one
group and small, regional actors in the other group. With
increased autonomy and shared centrality in the later
phases, increased equivalence is found by allowing even
smaller, regional actors to build up technology-based
transparency. TradeLens initially shows different user
groups with different fees. But even more interesting
is the lacking equivalence as expressed by blockchain
provider vs. blockchain user.
Based on the two cases, we propose that blockchains
enable more equivalence under the premise that the
connection is not based on the original business
relationship but with a functional reference, creating
transparency for the industry and when the actors are
on an equal footing in terms of their function. Being a
service provider and simultaneously service user created
inequality in the TradeLens case. There is reduced
inequality between producer or provider or appropriator
of the information in its new form with open standards
and profit-sharing. However, there is also a dark side
of equivalence that leads to a dilemma. The more equal,
the less likely it is, according to the theory, that one takes
action. This might be a restriction towards upscaling and
further development of the network and the application.
Without inequality, in the beginning, there might be no
initiative, and the more equalized the network is the
slower it might develop.
Density is finally an overall network property related
to the total network and refers to the interconnectedness
among the actors in the network. The likelihood of
action and response in a dense network differs from
that in a less dense network. According to the theory,
f.i. does higher density diminish centrality effects and
does, in general, dampen competitive effects. Density
is thus a kind of context-related moderator of the other
influencing factor for behavior.
TradeLens case shows heterogeneous actor
types with limited horizontal links within types
due to competition and links in vertical channels
for transactions. The gemstone industry is even
more unconnected due to the higher number of
different actors and their size. Both blockchains are
permission-based, creating a higher density within the
network and a density gradient between inside and
outside the network. Being part of the blockchain
provides actors with information access they would not
have without the blockchain. The more actors are in
the blockchain, and the higher is the effect. Here the
embeddedness views push back on the network effects.
In the Gemstone case, in particular, downstream actors
get an indirect connection to upstream actors they are
in fact not connected with. Similar indirect connections
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Colored Gemstone Case TradeLens Case
Early stage Current stage Early stage Current stage
Centrality – firm level
Industry
network
Medium - Few players with high centrality High - But oligopolistic with 3 market leading companiescollaborating in alliances
Blockchain
network
High - For central
initiator






High - For central initiator
Low - For minor peripheral
adopters




Autonomy - firm level
Industry
network
Medium - Many actors with structural
holes, few without
High - Efficient physical
supply chain




High - For initiator
and a few miners
Low - For other
adopters
High - Increased
for all by additional
relationships
High - For the sea part of the
shipments and, the initiating
shipping line
Low - for the other adopters




Equivalence – in pairwise comparison of types of actors
Industry
network
Low - Large international actors, small
regional actors in the other
Low - Between private companies and national authorities
High For competing private organisations along the supply











Low - Initiator different to
other users and technology
provider having monopolistic
position
High - Due to open
standards, a reference
board; and to sharing
business value (between the
extended initiator group of
three market leaders).
Density – on network level
Industry
network




ties for all adopting
actors
Low - Actors connected
peer-to-peer vertically but
less horizontally










indirect ties for all
actors
Medium - Permission
based, high density only
among within a blockchain
competing blockchain
High - Increased density and
network effects by indirect
ties across supply chains
network.
Table 1. Relationship Value related properties: Embeddedness
happen in the TradeLens case.
Our proposition is that the blockchain does not
necessarily increase the interconnectedness of the
industry, but it creates indirect interconnection for actors
that are a member of the blockchain. This creates higher
density within the blockchain as compared to outside the
blockchain. However, this interconnection is reduced to
functional aspects of transparency but not necessarily
linked to the commercial connections among actors.
Competitive elements are thus not necessarily affected.
5. Conclusion
Based on our investigation and analysis of the
two cases, we explored that - beyond technology
fit - the network fit is key to the success of
blockchain technology. While the fit between task
and technology represents a necessary condition for
blockchain adoption and use, the network value and
relationship value ultimately drive blockchain networks’
success. From our analysis of the supply chain cases
in two different industries, we reveal a good task and
technology fit in both cases. However, they differ in
terms of the network value and the relationship value
over time. Blockchain technology is well suited to
integrating the supply chain from end to end, creating
transparency across the organization’s chain with their
distributed information silos. The solution meets the
requested task to create transparency in real-time. The
Gemstone case is very successful in covering the
complete supply chain, including all stages of the
industry with a large number of actors in the blockchain
solutions. Similarly, for the TradeLens case, the
extended supply chain was initiated by Maersk being
the market leader with 15% market share and a few
minor partners; in the early years, TradeLens struggled
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lacking commitment from other than the initiator’s
close partners. As the owner of TradeLens in 2019,
Maersk gave in governance to the competitors, e.g.,
the other major shipping lines who then committed to
join TradeLens whereby TradeLens potentially facilitate
2/3 of the world transports in containers. Our analysis
finds that beyond the task technology fit, the centrality
and autonomy of the initiator is a good starting
position to launch the blockchain at an early phase.
However, the cases reveal that by remaining the only
central and autonomous player, the initiator cannot
increase adoption success in the long run. Hence,
in order to increase the adoption success and extend
the network along the supply chain, the initiator has
to increase the autonomy, equivalence, and density
of the organizations in the network and potential
adopters to enhance network value and relationship
value for these actors as well. Thus, only focusing
on improving the fit between technological features
and the resulting task technology value will not be
sufficient. Our investigation of the two cases reveals
that fit means complementing the task technology fit
with network fit. Accordingly, initiators, technology
providers, and early-stage adopters have to look for
ways to increase the network value and relationship
value. Future research can validate with increasing
number of cases possibly across additional types of
supply chains and industries e.g for pharmaceuticals or
industries with high intellectual capital expanding on
the task technology fit model in networks, including the
concept of structural embeddedness.
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